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Orientalist ideas could enter into alliance with general philosophical
theories and diffuse world hypotheses, as philosophers sometimes call
them; and in many ways the professional contributors to Oriental
knowledge were anxious to couch their formulation and ideas in language
and terminology whose cultural validity derived from other sciences and
systems of thought. Edward Said, Orientalism
1.  Introduction
On the whole, post-World War II international relations theory paid little attention
to domestic non-material factors such as national identity and culture.  Theory
became increasingly structuralist, and has drifted toward largely unvarying systemic
properties to deduce what were assumed to be uniform national interests.  Kenneth
Waltz’s seminal work Theory of International Politics, written in 1979, became the
symbol of this neo-realist tradition, which assumes states to be rational unitary actors,
pursuing the accumulation of power.  The focus of attention is the anarchical nature of
the international system, which is perceived to be the main factor explaining states’
behavior.  Neoliberalism, which ascribes major importance to international
institutions and emphasizes the possibility of cooperation among the states in the
anarchical system, has taken most of the neorealist assumptions for granted and have
maintained the “economic mode of analysis” which views states as unified and
rational actors.1)
Of course, it can also be argued that every basic notions of neo-realism, such as
security and power rely on the notion of identity, since their meaning depends on the
particular understanding of the “self,” survival and rationality.2) However, the identity
which resides in the neo-realist framework is homogenous and shared by all the actors
(states) in the international system as the framework envisages a single universal
meaning of survival, rationality and utilitarianism.
Theory, particularly problem-solving theory, which aims to provide a general
framework for solving puzzles in relations among the nations, cannot exist in a
vacuum detached from the actual dynamics of the world as its validity depends on its
utility and technical applicability.3) The end of the Cold War, which meant the end of
ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism, as well as the dramatic
developments in the international arena (for example, the war in former Yugoslavia)
that followed, resulted in a drastic revision of the theoretical framework as this events
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could not be explained by the established analytical approaches.4)
An important part of the revising process was to reconsider the relevance of
national characteristics to states’ foreign policy.  Scholars’ attention has been drawn by
the fact that different responses to questions related to European and Asian identities
have been frequently appearing in political speeches and programs (for example, the
notion of “Asian values” advocated by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad
and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew) and were presented as at least one of the factors that
determine the preferred foreign policy.
Furthermore, the concepts of identity and culture, which were perceived as
singular, self-evident, and non-problematic, have also undergone a revision, and the
motifs of multiplicity and social construction came to dominate the debate of identity
and culture in social theory in general.  The conception of identities has become
“emergent and constructed, contested and polymorphic, and interactive and process-
like.”5)
Japan has proved to be a popular case study in testing and verifying the usefulness
of the constructivist frameworks in explaining state domestic and foreign policies.
Works of Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger, which have become the cornerstones
of empirical constructivists’ scholarship, explore the norms and political culture of
postwar Japan and attempt to establish causality between those non-material factors
and Japan’s foreign and domestic policies during the same period.
The works discussed here are Peter J. Katzenstein’s Cultural Norms and National
Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (1996) and Thomas U. Berger’s Cultures of
Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (1998).  The arguments advanced
in these works have been repeated by the authors elsewhere,6) and citations from these
works will be used occasionally to clarify the points made.
The main purpose of this article is to expose the limitations of these analyses.  It
does not seek to question the validity of the constructivist theory in general, but limits
itself to outlining the pitfalls of the empirical works that have explored the
normative/cultural and foreign policy nexus in the context of postwar Japan.
However, since the author believes that one of the main sources of the shortcomings
discussed below is the need to establish a direct causal relationship between the
ideational and the state’s policy, this analysis probably has certain ramifications for the
constructivist framework in general.
Furthermore, the aim of this article is not to provide an argument supportive of the
neo-realist (or neo-liberal) analytical framework that focuses solely on the systemic
and perceives states to be rational actors.  In this article the author argues that the
focus on monolithic and comprehensive “culture” or normative structure combined
with the positivist approach as applied by Berger and Katzenstein results in
simplification and essentialization of both foreign policy and the non-material social
structures.  In other words, the author does not seek to refute the importance and the
validity of non-material aspects in analyzing international relations but criticizes the
constructivist positivism and its conception of national identity.  Furthermore, the
author seeks to criticize the dichotomous conception of both identity and foreign
policy that defines both of the discourses as either “militarist” or “pacifist.”
The following section will introduce the conceptual frameworks and the
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conclusions of the two authors.  This will be followed by an examination that
implements a suggestion made by Katzenstein himself to question what is “natural”
and “normal,”7) but also to go beyond the militarism/pacifism dichotomy that
dominates the works discussed here, and a decade later still continues to be the main
paradigm in Katzenstein’s newly developed “eclectic analysis” of Japan’s security.8)
Through a brief introduction of alternative approaches to Japan’s pacifism on one side
and its foreign/defense policy on the other, I will try to show that the perceptions of
both the cultural/normative structure and the policy as pacifist are too essentialized
and simplified to be regarded as a meaningful inquiry into either aspects of “Japan.”
2.  Constructivist Framework and Japan
Both Berger (1998) and Katzenstein (1996) are answering the same “big” question
of why Japan has been reluctant to use military force since the end of the Pacific
War.9) As Katzenstein formulates it, “Over the last few decades the Japanese police
and military have been, by international standard, very reluctant to use violence.”10)
Katzenstein argues that the contrast between Japan and the United States is self-
evident regarding the use of military force since the end of the Pacific War.  Berger’s
work is very much dominated by the same problematique, or what he calls the puzzle of
“the dog that did not bark,” with Japan representing the dog and the use of military
force the barking.11)
Both authors criticize the two dominant theoretical approaches to international
relations, or what Berger calls “system determinism and material rationalism”12) for
their lack of explanatory power.  Emphasizing the importance of the domestic as a
factor in shaping States’ policies, Berger criticizes the realist and liberal approaches for
their focus on the systemic.  He explains that States’ (governmental, my addition)
perceptions of the systemic signals and the tools of response that are available to
them, are influenced heavily by domestic forces.  Non-material factors play an
important role since actors understanding of the environment is conditioned by
cognitive perceptions.  These perceptions are in many ways a result of socially
negotiated understanding of past events.13)
Hence, an understanding of the cultural context within which the cognitive
perceptions are located, allows for a more comprehensive and detailed understanding
of State’s policy choices.14) Culture is seen as supplying the fundamental goals and
norms of political actors, determines the perception of domestic and international
political environment and conditions the ability to mobilize the national resources for
military purposes.15) Methodologically, Berger proposes that culture should be
disaggregated from behavior in order to avoid the tautology of deriving culture from
behavior, and can be discerned from public opinion polls, parliamentary debates,
books and articles by opinion leaders, newspaper editorials, and other sources of
information.16)
Katzenstein’s analytical framework also emphasizes the importance of the domestic
factors.  He explains that the realist approach is indeterminate in its understanding of
Japan’s security policy and is “too restrictive” as it treats Japan as a “unified and
rational actor.”17) While sympathetic with the liberal approach, which focuses on the
role of norms in regulating states’ behavior, Katzenstein criticizes it for overlooking
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the “thick” constitutive norms that “define the identities of the actors”18) and, in the
case of security policy, shape the interests that inform the policy.19) Norms are defined
as “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity.”20)
In general, this conception of the non-material factors and their relationship with
policy is located within the broadly defined constructivist framework, outlined by
Alexander Wendt.  Culture is defined as a “socially shared knowledge”21) which is
inscribed in the collective memory22) and constitutes the identities and interests of the
actors involved.23)
Both authors propose solutions that are rooted in domestic non-material factors.
According to Berger, the solution to the puzzle of why Japan, in spite of her
“economic and technological prowess” and formidable military potential24) did not use
military force as a tool of foreign policy “lies in the strong antimilitarist sentiments”
that emerged domestically in the wake of the World War II defeat.25) These
sentiments have played a vital role in the postwar national identity construction and
were institutionalized to become constitutive components of postwar political culture.
According to Berger, the Japanese have “stood the prewar cult of Bushido and the
Japanese warrior spirit on its head,”26) fundamentally changing their perceptions of
State’s interests and the international environment.  Berger concedes that other factors
may have played a role as well,27) but the cultural factors have had a “profound
influence”28) on Japan’s approach to national defense and security related issues.
Katzenstein, whose work focuses on institutionalized norms as shared knowledge
that has shaped the decision making process, notes that in the postwar period, the
Japanese have embraced an identity of a “merchant nation,” or an “economic
identity.”29) Japan’s external security is largely shaped by the normative context,
which is defined by the interaction between the institutionalized social norms that are
expressed by public opinion30) and the legal norms,31) which “condition the definition
of interests that inform Japan’s security policy.”32) These norms have become
institutionalized in the media, in the judicial system and in the bureaucracy and they
shape the interests and policy choices of the government.33) Besides the emphasis on
economic strength and the public support for Article 9 of the Constitution,
Katzenstein’s analysis emphasizes the norms of peaceful diplomacy, low-key
consensus approach, the lack of popular respect for the Self Defense Forces (SDF),
and the lack of willingness by the public to resort to armed defense.  These are seen as
proof of Japan’s stable anti-militarist social norm.34) The legal norms are those
embedded in Article 9 of the Constitution, which outlaws war and prohibits the state
the right of belligerency.35) Japan’s security policy is portrayed as being determined by
the interaction of the social and legal norms, which condition the definition of
interests that inform the policy.36)
3.  New Concepts, Old Ideas
There is no doubt that both works belong to a more sophisticated body of Western
scholarship which has been preoccupied with what John Dower37) calls “sizing up”
Japan.  However, there are two critical ontological and methodological issues which
undermine the validity of the empirical findings proposed by the works discussed.
Ontologically, the formulation of the puzzle involves a number of assumptions
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shared by a large part of the Japan-related scholarship that is preoccupied with Japan’s
uniqueness.  Like numerous other studies of Japanese society, these works evolve
around the same master narrative of Japan as different and as the “other” for the
(Anglo-Saxon [added by the author]) either in positive or negative terms.38) This body
of scholarship is dominated by the need to essentialize and simplify the various
aspects of Japanese society (or, what Clammer calls “categorical mode” limitations).
As a result, Japan, “one of the culturally richest, sociologically most complex and
conceptually most challenging of the societies, becomes dull.”39)
First, the postwar cultural/normative anti-militarism presupposes a drastic change
and a break from a culture of militarism.  It assumes an existence of militant and
inherently jingoistic totalizing normative/cultural structure in pre-1945 Japan, which
shaped Imperial Japan’s policy.  This perception of Japanese as being inherently
bloodthirsty has dominated the Western imagery since long ago, especially after the
attack on Pearl Harbor.40)
This assumption is most visible in Berger’s work.  One of the most vivid proofs for
this conception of prewar Japan is the emphasis on the lack of the concept of
“civilian” in prewar Japan, a concept which was introduced to Japan for the first time
by the American occupation.41)
A more careful analysis will reveal that “civilian” did exist in prewar Japan and was
translated as futsu¯min or heimin, while “civil” was translated as minkan no or shimin no.42)
A detailed inquiry into the creation of the concept bunmin reveals that it is related to
the drafting of the new constitution under the guidance of SCAP in 1946.  Among
other demands, the Far East Commission insisted on inserting “civilian” as one of the
qualifications for the Prime Minister and other members of Cabinet.  When the
Japanese government proposed “Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Cabinet
should not have a military background,” which in Japanese corresponds perfectly to
the “civilian control” demand, the Occupation authorities (commonly known as
GHQ) expressed its dissatisfaction and insisted on inserting “civilian” in Article 16.43)
As Yoshida Shigeru stated in his memoirs, since there was no explicit legal term (italics
added by author) in Japanese corresponding to “civilian,” eventually the compound
word bunmin was created.44)
Furthermore, in order to illustrate the militaristic nature of prewar Japan, Berger
gives an example of Fukuzawa Yukichi’s “Rich Country, Strong Nation” motto that
“reflected the country’s peculiar blend of militarism and with aggressive notions of
national destiny.”45) Besides that this is an over-simplified reading of the rich
philosophy of Fukuzawa, the leading Enlightenment thinker of Japan, Berger
completely forgets that Fukuzawa’s liberal ideas were not in favor during the years of
militarism and could hardly have been considered as part of that ideology.  Ironically,
Maruyama Masao, one of the most prominent critical intellectuals of postwar Japan,
has used Fukuzawa’s ideas to criticize Japan’s militarism.46) Also the rationale behind
the “strong nation” part of the motto as the need to preserve Japan’s independence
from the greed of European imperialism seems to be considered irrelevant.  Similarly,
the aggressive and bloody nature of European imperialism that provided the Meiji
rulers with enough reasons to worry about the future of Japan is also ignored in the
quest for the militaristic Japan.
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The nature of the pre-1945 Japanese normative or cultural structure is a rather
complex issue.  The simplistic understanding of Bushido as to “die happily for the
sake of one’s lord”47) was probably shared by the military, but it also must not be
forgotten that the ideology of Imperial Japan was more complex than simple jingoism
and also emphasized the peaceful and civilized nature of the Japanese.48)
It also should not be forgotten, that the broader notion of Bushido, popularized by
Nitobe Inazo¯ in his famous Bushido, The Soul of Japan (1899), originally written in
English as a depiction of Japanese moral code, does not deviate from the Western
norms and includes the pursuit of justice, courage, benevolence, politeness, sincerity
and loyalty.  In 1932, after Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and the growing criticism of
Japan in the West, Nitobe himself toured the United States with a series of lectures
trying to promote understanding and peace between Japan and the United States.
How deep did militarism penetrate into people’s minds is another important
question, providing an answer to which lies beyond the scope of this article.
However, it must be noted that even the highly orientalistic account of Japanese
national character provided by Ruth Benedict, written during the Pacific War, notes
that Bushido has been a “modern official term which has no deep folk-feeling behind
it.”49) Reflecting this complexity of the Japanese self-image, after the defeat in the
Pacific War, the newly “peaceful” Japan, was seen by many intellectuals not as a
departure but as a return to the traditional values.50) The argument of Japan as being
“traditionally peaceful” is also one of the cornerstones of the voluminous nihonjinron
literature that aims to establish the essence of Japan’s national identity.51) Actually,
Shiba Ryo¯taro¯, one of the most famous and widely read writers on the “original form”
of Japan argues that the militarism of the early Showa era was a deviation from the
“normal” values of Japanese society pursued by the military elites.52) As such, it seems
to be a grave oversimplification to claim that the cultural/normative framework of
“militarist” or “jingoistic” national character can provide a plausible explanation for
the pre-1945 behavior of Japan.
Needless to say, postwar Japan has not been unique in its “not barking policy.”
There are probably more nations in the world that did not deploy their military
overseas over the last five decades than did so over the same period of time.  Japan
and Germany stand out as leading economic powers and therefore the conception of
the puzzle, that is, the question of why Japan has not resulted to military force also
implies that economically powerful states are naturally bound to resort to a use of
force.  This conception conceals two major problems.  One is that this assumption can
be traced to the realist understanding of states’ interests, which the authors are actually
trying to deviate from.  After all, it is the realist framework of Hans Morgenthau and
Waltz that assumes that states’ interests are unified under a universal rationality of
power accumulation and the pursuit of self-preservation through means of violence.
Second, and more important, is that this formulation of the puzzle presupposes an
existence of situations where Japan would “rationally” need to resort to military
action.  There is no doubt that the case of postwar Japan is unique compared to other
economically powerful states.  However, her security environment has also been
unique, as Japan’s security policy has been firmly located within the framework of the
U.S.–Japan Alliance, where the United States has taken on itself a leading role.
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Furthermore, during the Cold War years, Japan never faced an immediate objective
or subjective security threat, that would force her to make drastic decisions regarding
the use of force.  Hence, it can be argued that the case of Japan provides positivist
evidence to support both the realist and constructivist theories53) since it never faced
the need to consider a military option.
Methodologically, the constructivist framework seeks to establish a positivist causal
relationship between the policy and the non-material structure.  As such both the
dependent and the independent variables are simplified and treated as relatively
stable and consistent in order to fit into the cause–effect framework.  As noted,
Katzenstein focuses on institutionalized norms which by definition become integral
and consistent parts of the social structure.  Berger notes that culture will experience
only incremental changes in response to ordinary historical events such as shifts in the
balance of power or the formation of international institutions.54)
Japan’s policy during the postwar years is also portrayed as consistently static.
Katzenstein accounts for the various changes that occurred in Japan’s security policies
over the four decades since the end of the Pacific War but concludes that no “sharp
changes” have occurred in the security policy.55) Berger engages in a very brief
discussion of the changes in the international environment, such as détente, its end,
and the end of the Cold War, and describes the responses of the political
establishment to these challenges.  While admitting that various changes have
occurred in Japan’s defense policies and interpreting them as a “rational learning
process”56) responding to domestic and international challenges, Berger asserts that
these changes were minor and the basic norms and values of different subgroups have
displayed continuity.57) Even such major shocks as the end of the Cold War and the
Gulf War forced Japan only to modify its views and to adopt “less parochial”
approaches to national security but these changes served only to confirm the
antimilitaristic core values.58) The yardstick for measuring change is unclear but it
seems that nothing short of full-scale invasion of a neighboring country conducted by
the SDF would account for a change in policy.
The essentialization implied in the focus on the general norms and culture
dangerously treads on the thin line between inquiry into Japan’s cultural setting and
the Orientalistic framework of analysis.  The comparison of the accounts of Japan with
the Western Orientalism is too tempting to be avoided here.  According to Edward
Said, present-day Orientalism can be seen not as a “sudden access of objective
knowledge,” but as a modified set of structures that previously dominated the
discourse and were modified by new trends in the social sciences.59) There is a certain
epistemological similarity between Orientalism and constructivist framework that
focuses on non-material factors, as both are providing accounts of collective behavior
based on essentialized images of culture and normative structures of the society.
However, stripped of the scientific language of political science, the findings of the
works discussed here seem to repeat numerous clichés that have been present in
other, less theoretically sound explorations into Japan’s culture and norms.
Hence, the Japanese Left “appeared almost hopelessly naïve” regarding the Soviet
propaganda and realities,60) and while it had been “idealizing” the communist nations,
the Right was “glorifying” the past of imperial Japan with the political Center
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“idealizing” the United States.61) It is interesting how this depiction of the Japanese
resonates with the one provided by General Douglas MacArthur, a well-known
“admirer” of the Japanese, who noted that “measured by the standards of modern
civilization, they [the Japanese] would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our
development of forty-five years.”62) More importantly, though, the Japanese
Communist Party, which had been the second major political party of the left but has
also been strongly nationalistic and pursued a course independent from both the
Soviet and Chinese Communist parties since the 1960s, is left out of this account of
Japan’s political spectrum.
There is nothing revealing about the notion of Japanese pacifism as the “uniquely
Japanese pacifism,” one which has been an integral part of nihonjinron.63) There,
pacifism is seen as part of Japan’s traditional values and perceives the postwar to be
basically a return to the normal.  Japan’s political culture as defined by the norms of
consensus has also been depicted in the nihonjinron literature64) and its origins have
been traced to the social and economic circumstances of the pre-modern mura
(village) society.65)
Interestingly, the nihonjinron literature of the 1970s and 1980s shares certain
ontological and epistemological premises with the constructivist works as its main goal
was to provide and explanation for Japan’s postwar success through culture, norms
and tradition.  On the policy level, we can agree with Hirano Kenichiro¯66) that heiwa
(peace) has become one of the keywords of post-Pacific War Japan diplomatic
ideology.  At the same time, the term’s purely rhetorical nature, the hollowness of
meaning, and contradictions with other “pillars” of Japan’s foreign relations, such as
the U.S.–Japan military alliance, have also been pointed out and criticized.67)
The last part of this article aims at showing the complexity and the dynamism of
the norms and culture, and providing some different interpretations of Japan’s security
policy, divorced from the causal framework of analysis.
4.  Beyond the Pacifism/Militarism Dichotomy
4.1  The General Interpretation of Postwar Pacifism
It is far beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed analysis of Japan’s
postwar political culture and norms.  However, by examining separately the societal
environment and the policy, this section hopes to expose the simplifications of the
dichotomous approach used by Berger and Katzenstein.  This section will illustrate
that if we depart from the pacifist/militarist dichotomy in analyzing the society and
the foreign policy, Japan’s “postwar” can be seen in a completely different light.
There is little doubt that the general perception among the Japanese public that
Japan is a “peaceful nation” has become part of the postwar mainstream discourse and
discussed by numerous Japanese intellectuals from various perspectives.68) However,
the actual meaning of this pacifism is highly debatable.  In general, the whole attempt
to find a consistent normative/cultural structure in the context of pacifism for postwar
Japan is problematic.  Numerous authors have emphasized the different stages in
Japan’s postwar era (sengo), with different ideologies and different master paradigms
that have dominated the intellectual debates and the general public.69)
First, I propose to examine the meaning of the Peace Constitution.  Katzenstein and
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Berger ascribe an important role to the Peace Constitution in the institutionalization of
the pacifist norm and the emergence of the anti-militarist culture respectively.  A
“dovish public climate” is seen as being “reinforced by the legal provisions”70) and the
antimilitary and pacifist clauses in the constitution have acted as important constraints
on Japanese military policy.71)
Obviously, in the immediate postwar years, the understanding that “peace” is to be
the common basis for the new Japanese state has been shared by all the groups in the
society, including even the nationalistic right-wing groups.72) This seems to be
common sensical as opposition to peace would mean the advancement of jingoism or
militarism, and there is no modern state that had these ideas as the basis of its
Constitution.73)
Furthermore, propagating militarism would have been unthinkable in Japan as the
country had been defeated military and economically.  Interestingly, the economic
factor (and not the pacifist mood or the constitution) was perceived as the main reason
for the general public reluctance to rearm, as was pointed out by American Japan
watchers in their analysis of Japanese public opinion in the late 1940s and early
1950s.74 Hence, it can be plausibly argued that initially Article 9 has been treated as a
self-evident expression of Japan’s postwar reality.  It also can be said to reflect the
realities of the international society of 1945–47, one which was tired of war and
hoping for long lasting international peace.75)
However, the interpretation of the Peace Constitution and its meaning has varied
greatly.  Maruyama, the most celebrated postwar scholar of Japanese political thought
and the most prominent progressive intellectual, has examined the normative
meaning of the abolition of armed forces and the renouncement of war.  He divides
the interpretations into two groups, those that see this as a manifestation of an ideal
which is separated from the real politics (dualism) and those that see the declaration as
imposing certain limitations of the politics, serving as a king of a “limiting fence” for
the actual policies to be pursued by the government.  However, in opposition to those
static interpretations, he proposes a more “progressive” one: the Constitution serving
as a broad and dynamic set of guidelines, a kind of a compass for the politics.76)
Departing from this understanding of the new Constitution, Maruyama interprets the
passages in the preface of the Constitution that refer to the Japanese people trusting in
the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world and the desire of
“Japanese people to occupy an honored place in the community of the peace loving
peoples.”  He perceives this not as an expression of desire to rely on other nations but
actually as extending a positive obligation on the government to engage in actions
necessary to achieve a peaceful resolution of international conflicts.77) In other words,
Maruyama perceives the Peace Constitution as progressive and internationalist,
committing Japan to active participation in the process of peaceful change of the
international society.78)
Few would argue that Japan has fulfilled this mission of active promotion of
international peace or that this interpretation of the constitution has found support
among the Japanese people.  One of the leaders of the peace movement, Kuno
Osamu, wrote in 1953 that unfortunately both the pacifist idea and the realistic
idealism are yet to be embraced by the political power and so far have remained on
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the “civilian” level.79) However, even on the societal level, the notion of pacifism has
evolved from being a negative concept in pre-1945 Japan to a positive symbol, but
failed to become part of the (national) consciousness.80)
Hence, the “popular pacifism” or “defending the constitution” movement of the
1950s and 1960s can be interpreted more as an expression of Japan’s nationalism than
as an expression of popular belief in international peace.  The “people” did not want
war, but the main consideration was to avoid war on Japan’s land.  The greatest fear
of the Japanese was the reoccurrence of the attacks on the Japanese homeland which
were still vividly remembered by the majority of the population.81) These memories
were also part of the sentiment behind the mass anti-U.S.–Japan alliance
demonstrations in 1960.  As one of the participants recalls, the “defending the Peace
Constitution” cause was mainly justified by the slogan “Never again war on our
land!”82)
As is visible from public opinion polls conducted in the early 1950s, the majority of
the Japanese did not oppose recreation of the military per se, but opposed it in the
context of the military becoming part of the American forces.  The same reason was
behind the opposition to overseas deployment of the newly created Self Defense
Forces, namely it was not much of a pacifist belief but more an expression of
nationalism, a lack of desire to get involved in a war, conducted by the former
enemy.83)
Interestingly, Eiji Oguma traces certain parallels between the various anti-colonial
movements and the Japanese “defending the constitution” movement (goken undo¯).
The situation which “small and weak” Japan found itself in the early 1950s in the
context of her relations with the United States has resembled the colonial setting, and
hence the opposition to constitutional revision was more an expression of nationalism
directed towards both the United States and the Soviet Union than an expression of
pacifism.84)
The mass anti-U.S.–Japan Alliance movement (AMPO) of 1960 had been an
expression of anger towards the “undemocratic” way Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke
concluded the treaty and was dominated by the slogans of “patriotism” and “nation.”
As such, it was also much more an expression of anti-American nationalism than
pacifism.  Emerging from the war memories of the intellectuals, Kishi, the pardoned
war criminal, symbolized all the bad of the imperial past, and their anger was very
much a product of their own guilty consciousness regarding their passive stance
during the years of militarism.  On the other side, the “citizens” that participated in
the demonstrations were not interested in the ideological rivalries of the Marxist,
Trotskyist, and other student groups, but were instead motivated by the feeling of
struggle against corrupt politicians.85)
While it can be argued that initially there was a certain synergy between the
progressive intellectuals and the masses, since the failure to prevent the renewal of the
U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the progressive intellectuals became further and
further alienated from the general public.86) While the intellectuals continued their
critique of the alliance with the United States, a general “optimism regarding the
further continuity of peace in Japan” and growing lack of interest in foreign affairs
spread among the Japanese public.  However it can be explained by a simplistic (or,
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overly optimistic) view of the state of international affairs and Japan’s place in it.  This
view is not based on pacifism but founded on the self-centered belief that Japan is
unlikely to get involved in a conventional war, that at least in the near future nuclear
war will not occur, and that the international economic activities of Japan are peaceful
and cannot present a threat to peace.87)
4.2  Public Opinion Polls
The public opinion polls cited by both Katzenstein and Berger as a proof of a
widely spread pacifism, reveal a rather different picture if examined detached from
the comparison with the imaginary jingoistic “spirit of Bushido” and beyond the
related pacifist/militarist dichotomy.
Asahi Shinbunsha publishing house has continuously conducted public opinion
polls regarding the general population’s views on the constitution and military and
defense policy.  In the overall summary of the Japanese public attitudes during the
“postwar” years, written in the last days of the Cold War, the general trend of the
Japanese attitudes is seen as not favoring Japan becoming a military superpower but
as having consistently agreed to the need of a military.  The public has also affirmed
that over the years, since its creation, the SDF has played an important role in
protecting Japan’s peace.  Only 15% in 1970 and 21% in 1988 of those polled stated
that there was no need to rely on military power and there is no need for either the
SDF or the American military to protect Japan.88)
The public opinion polls conducted annually by the Prime Minister’s Office
confirm these findings as they reveal a gradually increasing favorable impression
regarding the SDF among the public during the Cold War years (66% in 1967 and
74.3% in 1984) and the need to maintain or increase the present level of defense
capability (44.4% and 22% respectively in 1969 and 61.4% and 12.6% in 1984) and
only a minority supporting a reduction in defense capabilities (10.8% in 1969 and
11.8% in 1984)89) (Prime Minister’s Office [Naikakufu] homepage http://www8.cao.go
.jp/survey/ accessed on October 10 and October 15, 2004).
“Unarmed neutrality,” which has been one of the main slogans of the intellectuals
of the left, found little support among the general public in the years after the 1960
protests.  In a poll conducted in 1967, only 17% supported unarmed neutrality as the
optimal way to guarantee Japan’s security.90) In a similar poll conducted in 1975,
fifteen years after the mass protests against the U.S.–Japan security alliance, only 9%
showed support for the abolition of the U.S.–Japan Security treaty and the abolition or
reduction of SDF forces.  In 1984, the numbers of supporters of the abolition of the
U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and the reduction or abolition of the SDF further
decreased to 6.8%.  Furthermore, 57% answered that, while diplomacy should be the
most important way to prevent acts of aggression against Japan, a necessary minimum
of defense capabilities should be maintained.  Also, 44% in 1976 and 60% in 1981
replied positively when asked whether there was a possibility of Japan being involved
in some kind of military conflict.  In 1981, out of the 34% that negated this possibility,
only 29% stated the reason to be the war abolition norm under the present
constitution, while 28% stated the United Nations efforts to achieve international
peace, reflecting the “naïve optimism” criticized by Nakamura.91)
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Regarding the “fighting spirit” of the Japanese, the large majority has always shown
a willingness to defend their country.  True, to the direct question regarding a will to
protect the country, the percentage of polled that have expressed a strong or quite
strong willingness has been relatively low (around 50%), followed by “I cannot say” or
“I do not know” (around 40%).  However, it must be noted that those polled were
asked to express the strength of their will as “compared to others.”  Treading
dangerously on the line of Orientalism myself, I would attribute the low level of
expressions of strong willingness to defend Japan and a high percentage of “do not
know” to the Japanese modesty and humility when asked to compare themselves with
others.  Furthermore, it must be also remembered that the numbers of those that have
explicitly expressed a weak willingness to defend their country has consistently been
very low (around 7%).
The author believes that the figures below that show the patterns of response to the
question regarding their action in case of invasion confirms the above speculation and
also the existence of patriotism and a readiness to defend their homeland among the
Japanese population.  In 1969, only 6.5% replied that they would not resist invasion,
12.5% said they will resist in a non-violent way, 42% said they would support a violent
resistance, and 36.9% said that they do not know.92) In 1982, when asked the same
question, 43% replied that they would either participate or support violent resistance,
16% replied that they would resist in a non-violent way, and only 12% replied that
they would not engage in any act of resistance.93)
Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, the numbers of “realists” and
“patriots” have continued to climb.  In 1991, 62.4% replied that Japan’s security
should be achieved through the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and the SDF, 7.3% have
shown support for self-reliance thorough the abolishment of the Security Treaty and
the enhancement of the SDF, and only 10% have shown support to the “unarmed
neutrality” to be achieved through abolishment of the Security Treaty and either
reduction of the SDF capabilities or its complete abolishment.94)
In 2003, after the beginning of the War on Terror and Japan’s participation in it,
responding to a question regarding their actions in case of invasion by a foreign force,
48.9% said they would support the SDF in one way or another, 18.3% said they would
resist in a non-violent way, and only 7.7% (from the highest of 12.4% in 1981) replied
that they would not resist in any way.  At the same time, an equal number of
respondents replied that they would fight the invaders by joining the SDF or engaging
in guerilla resistance.95)
Furthermore the collective memory of the Pacific War, which is generally
perceived as the central driving force in the opposition to Japan’s remilitarization, has
undergone an important transformation with the change of generations.  In an
opinion poll regarding Japanese perceptions of the pre-1945 history, almost half of
those polled (44.8%) replied that Japan’s military interventions were unavoidable acts
of survival and the largest number (36.9%) of the polled replied that the people were
the victims of militarist propaganda and hence bear no responsibility.96)
Possibly it can be argued that, reflecting the non-existence of an actual or perceived
threat to national security and lack of patriotic education, the Japanese “fighting spirit”
has been lower and the perceptions of international affairs much more optimistic than
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those of Americans or Europeans.  However, the results of the above analysis reveal a
population neither pacifist or militarist, but one that firmly supports its military and
the military alliance with the United States, with a large majority willing to actively
contribute to the protection of the country in one way or another in case of invasion.
It seems that we can confidently conclude that this population can hardly be called
pacifist or even anti-militarist in the sense of opposing the legitimacy of the military or
military solutions or believing in Gandhi-like non-violent resistance.
In light of these findings, the popular reluctance to actively participate in the first
Gulf War, which is used by Berger as evidence of Japanese pacifism, can be more
correctly interpreted not as pacifism but as a manifestation of a lack of interest in
affairs which are not perceived as directly related to Japan.  As Oguma has noted,
Japan has been suffering from isolationism, meaning “rejection of any troublesome
event outside Japan in an attempt to maintain domestic peace and stability.”97)
4.3  Views of Japan’s Security Policy
As already mentioned, during the Cold War years Japan did not face an actual or
perceived danger that would demand a result to military means.  During the two main
wars (Korea and Vietnam) that have taken place in Asia during those years, Japan’s
establishment has been preoccupied with achieving more immediate national interests
and perceived the wars more as opportunity than as threats.
During the Korean War, from which Japanese economy benefited greatly, the
perception of immediate danger to Japan’s security did not exist among the Japanese
elite98) and Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s policy had generally been oriented
towards regaining independence from the American-led occupation.99) Furthermore,
it seems that the general public also did not feel threatened even when the North
Korean army was rapidly advancing southward and, in general, did not show much
interest in the war.100)
The same lack of threat perception continued to prevail across political factions and
social classes after the San Francisco Peace treaty was signed and Japan again became
an independent nation.  In an opinion poll conducted among business leaders, high
government officials, labor union leaders, and scholars in May 1954, just over a year
after the truce in the Korean peninsula, only 3% of the respondents indicated a fear of
communism or communist a ggression.101) At the time, the reluctance to re-arm in
response to American demands during the Korean War was rooted not in the fear of
war but in the need to focus on economic recovery, Prime Minister Yoshida’s
personal suspicion of the military, the harsh economic situation, and the alarmist view
of Japan’s rearmament by Australia and other neighboring countries.102)
The Vietnam War, the other major war in Asia, was perceived by a large number
of the population as a war of American aggression but not directly related to Japan.
The anti-American feelings among the Japanese public were on the rise, and the
government, trying to facilitate the return of Okinawa, was preoccupied with
maintaining the stability in the relationship with the United States.103)
As for the Soviet threat, the Japanese have never felt it to be as menacing as in
Western Europe.  A surprise attack by the Soviet Union on Japan was never a
conceivable possibility for the Japanese policy establishment.104)
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Needless to say, Japan’s general postwar policy has rarely been perceived as pacifist
by the Asian nations, especially China and South Korea.  As already mentioned
above, the issue of Japan’s frictions with these two nations is complex and should not
be treated as a simple reflection of Japan’s policies.  However, the fact that Japan has
never managed to project the pacifist nation image into the regional debates and her
intentions continue to be viewed with suspicion should not be forgotten.  In other
words, the argument regarding Japan as a peaceful nation contrastingly different from
Imperial Japan has certain validity in the domestic and Western discourse, but has
been continuously rejected in the regional discourse on Japan.
Furthermore, Japan’s policy has rarely been perceived as pacifist by the domestic
intellectuals, who have continuously criticized the government for not living up to the
standards set by the Peace Constitution.  Ishida Takeshi, one of the main ideologues
of pacifism in postwar Japan, reviewed the place of Japan in the postwar international
system, and observed that in spite of the fact that Japan has not been directly involved
in any military conflict since the end of the Pacific War, it has become an important
contributor to the “structural violence” through its economic activities overseas and
indirect support of militarization of numerous Asian states.105) He warned that the
concepts “peace” and national security have become identical, both on the policy
level and as part of the broad public Weltanschaung.106)
Writing during the final stages of the Cold War, Sakamoto Yoshikazu, of Tokyo
University and one of the leading public intellectuals of that time, stated that in light
of the recent developments such as new emergency legislation, the controversial
official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, kigensetsu (Anniversary of the Empire Foundation),
and textbooks related problems, as well as the increase in defense expenditures, it
seemed that the Japanese government had embarked on the road of militarization.
Hence, he classified Japan as a medium military power.107)
In the same book edited by Sakamoto, the Japanese people are warned that today
“even the small territory of Japan is densely covered with modern weapons” and that
the process of “snatching away the peace from Japanese society and bringing
militarization to Japanese society” is rapidly advancing.108) The authors see the process
of militarization as being fueled by the rise of “military technocrats,” the weakening of
the democratic idea in Japan that is reflected in domestic and international policies
and the friendly, and, from an economic perspective, mutually beneficial relations that
Japan has established with military dictatorships in numerous developing countries.109)
It also has been pointed out that the Japanese military might have become a few
times larger that that of the Imperial Japanese Army, and that starting from 1970s
Japanese defense budget (as of 1980s) has become the sixth largest in the world, larger
than the budgets of the four Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and Austria
combined.110)
These perceptions of Japan’s security policy were not limited to domestic
intellectuals; they have been shared by numerous foreign Japan experts.  Like
Sakamoto, Glenn Hook also views the changes that occurred in Japan during the
1970s and 1980s as of major importance and sees it also as the process of the
militarization of Japan.111) Hook notes that Article 9 of the Constitution, which is
supposed to be the basic document of the anti-militaristic norm, has been subject to
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various interpretations, ranging from the admission of wars of self-defense to the
comprehensive prohibition of all kind of wars, including wars of self-defense.  He
asserts, quoting the head of the United States Defense Information Center in support
of his claim, that already by 1984 Japan was well on the way to becoming a military
power and in 1985, after the appreciation of the yen resulting from the Plaza Accord,
its military budget became the third largest in the world based on dollar
calculations.112)
In spite of no experience in actual warfare, the SDF has come to be considered as
one of the most potent armies in the region.  As Ian Gow has noted, the SDF is the
“most technologically sophisticated non-nuclear force in the Asia-Pacific.”113) As of
2001, only China surpassed Japan’s military budget and both of the countries’ budgets
combined account for more than 60% of East Asia and Australasia’s defense
expenditures (The Military Balance, October 2002).  In short, the perception of Japan
as a pacifist state has not been shared by the progressive domestic intellectuals and
even by some Western Japan specialists.
Even the so-called “nuclear allergy,” or the three anti-nuclear principles that were
established in 1967 by the Sato¯ cabinet, that is, the political decision not to possess,
produce, or introduce nuclear weapons, which, along with the Constitution, can be
seen as the second pillar of Japan’s pacifism, were far from being as solid as claimed
by Katzenstein.114) The evidence that in spite of the anti-nuclear stance Japan’s actual
policy has been much more pragmatic than advertised officially has been plentiful.  In
2004, Ohta Masakatsu, a Kyodo news agency reporter in the United States, provided
a detailed account based mainly on American documents, of Japan’s nuclear policy
since the end of the Pacific War.  In general, it argues that Japan has continuously
maintained the possibility of developing an independent nuclear arsenal and on
various occasions has secretly agreed to American nuclear weapons being brought to
Japan.  The purely rhetorical nature on the “three no’s” is obvious from the fact that
one of the governmental studies into the possibility of developing nuclear weapons
was conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968, less than one year after its
declaration by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku.115) The Asahi Shinbun has also revealed that
in 1970 Nakasone Yasuhiro, at that time Director-General of the Defense Agency,
agreed to American nuclear weapons being brought into Japan at a meeting with
United States government officials.116) In 2002, Wakaizumi Kei, who served as Prime
Minister Sato¯’s secret envoy to negotiations on the return of Okinawa, mentioned a
secret memorandum in which Japan agreed to the American deployment of nuclear
weapons on Okinawa in the case of an emergency.  Furthermore, there is also plenty
of evidence that Japan has considered the possibility of building nuclear armaments
on at least three occasions and that the option was rejected on purely strategic
grounds.117)
4.4  Post-Cold War Developments
How should we interpret the recent developments in Japan’s domestic and
international stance?  An analysis of the developments conducted within the
“pacifist/militarist” dichotomy would conclude, like Tamamoto Masaru,118) that Japan’s
participation in the War on Terror in Afghanistan and in the Second Gulf War, the
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swift adoption of various national security-related legislation,119) and the growth of
constitutional revision momentum should be interpreted as a revolutionary change in
the normative structure and in the foreign policy strategy.  It concludes that Japan is
losing its identity of a “civilian power”120) and transforming into a “militaristic” nation.
However, a less categorical look at the public opinion trends reveals that there has
not been any change in public opinion regarding militarism or forceful solutions of
international conflicts.  Since 1993, constitutional revision has been gradually gaining
support among the broad population.  The overwhelming majority of the supporters
of the revision (around 50%) have stated the need for Japan to engage actively in
contributing to international society as the main reason.121) The public has also shown
support of the SDF dispatch to Iraq as part of the humanitarian effort (49% and 55%
in January 2004; TV Asahi poll, February 21, 2004).  In the most recent poll
conducted by the Prime Minister’s Office in 2005, the majority of the polled (49.3%)
voted for an active participation in humanitarian aid and peaceful resolution of
regional conflicts as the most important international role for Japan.122)
However, the debates regarding the revision of the constitution and overseas
dispatch of the SDF are conducted within the framework of international peace
building and peace keeping and do not indicate in anyway “Americanization” or
Japan’s involvement in overseas conflicts.  After all, the same public has shown a
strong opposition to the war in Iraq war per se (79% against; TV Asahi poll, February
22, 2003) and only 14% has expressed support of the American invasion.123)
Furthermore, the support for the SDF presence in Iraq has decreased sharply,
following the revelations regarding the non-existence of weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq and the growing Iraqi resistance to the occupation (for example, NHK polls
regarding the Iraq War conducted in 2003, NHK homepage.) There is little evidence
that the “active participation in peaceful resolutions” means becoming an active
partner in American wars for the Japanese.
It seems that there is a stronger will among the public for Japan’s more active
participation in international affairs, including United Nations peace keeping and
humanitarian missions.  This is paralleled by the rise of patriotic feelings and the
decrease in guilt regarding the misdeeds of Imperial Japan.  However, this should not
be viewed as an abandonment of pacifism in favor of militarism, but as a complex and
dynamic social change.
5.  Conclusion
The purpose of this brief analysis is not to argue that, contrary to Katzenstein and
Berger’s propositions, Japan has never ceased being a militaristic nation, as claimed
by some alarmists.124) Obviously, the structure of Japanese politics, the role of the
military, the definitions of national interest, and the social and legal normative
contexts of postwar Japan are fundamentally different from those of pre-1945 Japan.
It is beyond doubt that the war experience, the constitution, and the popular mood
have established certain parameters125) within which political leadership has operated.
However, this article argues that the perception of Japan (her social structures and
foreign policy) in terms of either pacifist or militarist is simplistic and essentialist.  The
adoption of the “Peace Constitution” and the rhetoric about “peaceful Japan,” as well
168
as the fact that Japan has not engaged in military operations overseas since the end of
the Pacific War126) till the beginning of the War on Terror do not necessarily mean
societal and political pacifism.  Detached from the “pacifist/militarist” dichotomy,
different periods of postwar Japan’s policy and public opinion can be interpreted in a
number of ways, such as political realism, isolationism, and even nationalism.
The main conclusion is that the focus on broad and consistent general norms and
culture as positivist factors determining foreign policy results in a simplified and
essentialized analysis of both.  In order to provide a more nuanced analysis of
national identity and its relationship with foreign policy, the author argues that it is
important to fo cus on particular identity discourses and to abandon the positivist
approach.
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